The log-linear learning algorithm has been extensively studied in game theoretic and distributed control literature. A central appeal of log-linear learning for distributed control is that it often guarantees agents' behavior will converge in probability to the optimal configuration. However, one of its central issues is that the worst case convergence time can be prohibitively long, e.g., exponential in the number of players. We formalize a modified log-linear learning algorithm whose worst case convergence time is roughly linear in the number of players. We prove this characterization in semi-anonymous potential games with limited populations, i.e., in potential games where the agents' utility functions can be expressed as a function of aggregate behavior within each population.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theoretic learning algorithms have gained traction as a powerful design tool for distributed control systems [6] , [8] , [13] , [21] , [23] . Here, a static game is repeated over time and agents are permitted to revise their strategies in response to their objective functions and other agents' behavior. Emergent behavior for such revision strategies has been studied extensively in the literature, e.g., fictitious play [5] , [14] , [15] , regret matching [10] , log-linear learning [1] , [3] , [20] , among others. While many results characterize desirable asymptotic guarantees, convergence times associated with these algorithms remain uncharacterized or have been shown to be prohibitively long [4] , [9] , [11] , [20] . Characterizing convergence rates is key to determining whether a game theoretic algorithm is desirable for system control.
The class of games known as potential games [16] has received significant research attention with regards to distributed control. A game is a potential game if each agent's local objective function is "aligned" with some global system level objective function. Although potential games may not naturally emerge in many social systems, there are methods for designing local objective functions in engineering systems so that (i) the resulting game is a potential game and (ii) the optimal behavior corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game [2] , [13] , [22] . Consequently, significant research has aimed to derive distributed learning algorithms which converge to this efficient Nash equilibria in potential games.
Log-linear learning is one algorithm that accomplishes this task [3] . It is a perturbed best reply process where individual agents commonly select the best action given their belief regarding the behavior of other agents. Agents occasionally make mistakes and select suboptimal actions with a probability that decays exponentially with respect to the potential payoff loss. As noise levels tend to zero, the resulting process has a unique stationary distribution with full support on the efficient Nash equilibria. Thus, by designing the agents' local objective functions appropriately, log-linear learning can be used to derive distributed control laws with highly desirable asymptotic guarantees.
Unfortunately, convergence rates associated with loglinear learning in its nominal form have been shown to be exponential in the game size [20] . This stems from inherent tension between desirable asymptotic behavior and convergence rates. The tension arises from the fact that small noise levels are necessary for ensuring that the bulk of the mass of the stationary distribution lies on the efficient Nash equilibria; however, small noise levels also make it difficult to leave inefficient Nash equilibria which ultimately slows convergence rates.
Positive results regarding convergence rates of loglinear learning and its variants are beginning to emerge for specific problem instantiations [12] , [17] , [20] . In [20] , the authors introduce a log-linear learning variant and show that for a class of potential games, i.e., congestion games with symmetric agents and singleton strategies, convergence rates grow roughly linearly in the number of agents. Similar positive results were derived in [17] which focuses on local interaction games with a sufficiently sparse interaction structure. Two dominant questions that emerge are: (i) Do such positive results extend to broader classes of games? (ii) Is it possible to design systems to fit into one of these two classes?
This paper focuses on the first question. We introduce a class of games termed semi-anonymous potential games. Such games can be parameterized by populations of agents where each agent's local objective function can be evaluated using only information regarding the agent's own decision and the aggregate behavior within each of the populations. First, we introduce a variant of log-learning learning for semi-anonymous potential games that closely resembles the algorithm introduced in [20] . Next, we prove that for semi-anonymous potential games, the convergence rates associated with this algo-rithm grows roughly linearly in the number of agents provided that the number of populations is bounded. This result is an extension of [20] which focuses purely on the single population setting.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a game with agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} where each agent i ∈ N has a finite action set denoted by A i and a utility function U i : A → R where A = i∈N A i denotes the set of joint actions. We will frequently express an action profile a ∈ A as (a i , a −i ) where a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) denotes the collection of actions of all agents other than agent i. Similarly, we let A −i = A 1 × · · · × A i−1 × A i+1 × · · · × A n denote the action sets of all players excluding i. We will denote a game G by the tuple
Definition 1: A game G is a semi-anonymous potential game 2 if there exists a partition N = (N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N m ) of N such that: (i) For any population N i ∈ N and agents i, j ∈ N i we have A i = A j . We say population N i has action set A Ni = {a 1 Ni , a 2 Ni , . . . , a si Ni } where s i denotes the number of actions available to population N i . (ii) The utility function of any agent i ∈ N can be expressed as a lower-dimensional function of the form
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
(iii) There exists a potential function φ : X → R such that for any a ∈ A and agent i ∈ N with action a i ∈ A i ,
where x : A → X captures each population's aggregate behavior in a. More specifically, x(a) = (x 1 (a), x 2 (a), . . . , x m (a)) where, for any j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
If each agent i ∈ N is alone in its respective partition, the definition of semi-anonymous potential games is equivalent to that of exact potential games in [16] . Example 1: Consider a congestion game with players N = {1, . . . , n} and roads R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k }. Road r ∈ R has congestion function C r : Z + → R, where C r (k) is the congestion on road r with number of users k. Player i's action set is A i ⊆ 2 R , and he selects a set of roads in A i to minimize his cost of J i (a i , a −i ) = r∈ai C r (|{a} r |), where {a} r is the set 1 For brevity, we refer to G by G = (N, {A i }, {U i }). 2 Semi-anonymous potential games are similar to a discretized version of population games, introduced in [19] . However, here we do not require that agents in the same population have identical utility functions. of players choosing road r ∈ R under joint action profile a. This game has potential function φ :
When player actions sets are asymmetric, a congestion game is an semi-anonymous potential game. In the case where player action sets are symmetric, the congestion game is an anonymous potential game.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our algorithm, modified log-linear learning, is a mild variant of the algorithm in [20] . Let a(t) represent the action profile at some time t ≥ 0. For any population N j ∈ N , each agent i ∈ N j has a Poisson clock of rate
; a player has a higher update rate if the player is not using a common action. If player i's clock ticks, he chooses action a i ∈ A i = A Nj probabilistically according to
indicates the player's updated action choice and β dictates how likely a player is to choose a high payoff action; as β → ∞, payoff maximizing actions are chosen, and as β → 0, players choose from their actions sets with uniform probability. Accordingly, the new action is of the form a(t + ) = (a i (t + ), a −i (t)).
Update rates are the only difference between this algorithm and the standard logit response continuous time implementation. In standard logit response dynamics, agents have a fixed rate 1 Poisson clock, yielding n expected total updates per second. The expected number of updates per second for modified log-linear learning is lower bounded by mαn and upper bounded σαn. To achieve an expected update rate at least as fast as the standard log-linear learning update rate, we may set α ≥ 1/m. For any α, these dynamics define an ergodic, reversible Markov process.
The following theorem extends the results of [20] to semi-anonymous potential games.
For any ε ∈ (0, 1) and any initial state, under modified log-linear learning, if
where c 1 is a constant that depends only on s. Theorem 1 is proved in the appendix. The results in [20] focus on a special class of semi-anonymous potential games with a single population, i.e., m = 1. The bounds given in [20] are better than the bounds provided in Theorem 1 because the aggregate state space, X, grows significantly with the number of populations. The impact of this larger state space is realized with the dependence of the mixing time bound on the number of populations, m, both directly and indirectly in the β parameter requirement. For a fixed number of populations, the mixing time grows as n log log n.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We present an example which supports our theorem that the convergence time for modified log-linear learning grows as Θ(n log log n). Consider a resource allocation game with resources R = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 } and agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} distributed into two populations, N 1 and N 2 . Suppose each population contains n/2 agents, where n is even. A player in population N 1 may choose one resource from {r 1 , r 2 }, and a player in population N 2 may choose one resource from {r 2 , r 3 }.
A state x ∈ X can be represented as a tuple of the form x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) where nx 1 and nx 2 are the numbers of players from N 1 choosing resources r 1 and r 2 respectively. Likewise, nx 3 and nx 4 are the numbers of players from N 2 choosing resources r 2 and r 3 respectively. For x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) ∈ X, the welfare for each resource in R is given by
W 3 (x) = e 2.5x4 − 1 e 2 and the system welfare for state x is given by W (x) = W 1 (x)+W 2 (x)+W 3 (x). By defining each agent's utility as its marginal contribution to the system welfare, i.e.,
we have a semi-anonymous potential game with potential function W . The allocation that optimizes the system welfare is when a i = r 2 for all i ∈ N , i.e., x opt = (0, 1/2, 1/2, 0).
We simulated our proposed algorithm with rate α = 1/σ starting from an inefficient Nash equilibrium x ne = (1/2, 0, 0, 1/2). Using Theorem 1, we examine the time it takes for the total variation distance between the 
where the empirical frequency for a given state x ∈ X is defined by
The indicator function I returns 1 if the state x(τ ) is x and 0 otherwise, so that component ν x (t) is the percentage of time from τ = 1 to τ = t that the system has been in state x. Setting β = 50 ensures that E π W (a) ≥ max x∈X W (a) − ε/2, so that, when
per Theorem 1. Simulation results are shown in Figure 1 for an average over 100 simulations with n ranging from 4 to 100. Average convergence times are bounded below by 7n log log n and above by 100n log log n; when n > 32 average convergence rates are bounded above by 11n log log n. These results support our main theorem.
V. CONCLUSION We have extended the results of [20] to define dynamics for a class of semi-anonymous limited population potential games whose player utility functions may be written as functions of aggregate behavior within each population. For games with a small number of fixed allowable actions and a small number of fixed populations, the time it takes to come arbitrarily close to a potential function maximizer is linear in the number of players.
APPENDIX

A. Markov chain preliminaries
A continuous time Markov chain, {X t } t≥0 , over finite state space Ω may be written in terms of a corresponding discrete time chain with transition matrix M [18] :
(3) We refer to M as the kernel of the process X t . The following definitions and theorems are taken from [18] , [20] . Let µ, ν be measures on finite state space Ω. Total variation distance is defined as
and the relative entropy is defined as
Then,
For a continuous time Markov chain with kernel M and stationary distribution π, the distribution µ(t) obeys
where ρ(M ) is the Sobolev constant of M , defined by
with
Here E π denotes the expectation with respect to distribution π. For a Markov chain with initial distribution µ(0) and stationary distribution π, the total variation and relative entropy mixing times are
respectively. From [18] , Corollary 2.6 and Remark 2.11,
where π min := min x∈Ω π x . Applying (6),
Hence, a lower bound on the Sobolev constant yields an upper bound on the mixing time for Markov chain.
B. Markov chain defined by modified log-linear learning
The following Markov chain M over space X is the kernel of the continuous time modified log-linear learning process. Let e j i ∈ R si be the jth standard basis vector of length s i for j ∈ {1, . . . , s i }. From x = (x Ni .x N−i ) ∈ X, transition to the next state as:
• Choose a population N i ∈ {N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N m } with probability s i /σ • Choose an action a j Ni ∈ A Ni with probability 1/s i .
• If x j Ni > 0, choose p ∈ {p ∈ N i : a p = a j Ni } u.a.r. to update according to (1) , i.e., transition to
x Ni + 1 n (e k i − e j i ), x N−i with probability
for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , s i }.
Using this to define transition probabilities in M , for any allowable transition from state x = (x Ni , x N−i ) ∈ X to state y = x Ni + 1 n (e k i − e j i ), x N−i ∈ X in which a player from population N i updates his action,
For a transition of any other form, M (x, y) = 0. Applying (3) to the chain with kernel M and global clock rate ασn, modified log-linear learning evolves as
C. Theorem 1 supporting lemmas
To prove Theorem 1 we require three supporting lemmas. Lemma 1 (i) establishes the stationary distribution for modified log-linear learning as a function of β and (ii) characterizes how large β must be so that the expected value of the potential function is within ε/2 of maximum. Lemma 2 lower bounds the Sobolev constant for the Markov chain M , which yields an upper bound on its mixing time per Equation (14) . Lemma 3 relates the Sobolev constant to the mixing time to within ε/2 of the stationary distribution for the continuous time modified log-linear learning process. The lemmas and method of proof for Theorem 1 follow the structure of the supporting lemmas and proof for Theorem 3 in [20] .
Lemma 1: For the potential game G = (N, A i , U i ) with state space X and potential function φ : X → R the stationary distribution for modified log-linear learning is
Moreover, if φ is λ-Lipschitz, i.e.,
The proof follows closely with the structure of the proof in [20] of Lemma 6 and is omitted for brevity. Proof: Using the technique of [20] , we compare the Sobolev constants for the chain M and a similar random walk on a convex set. We follow these steps:
Step 1: Let M be the Markov chain M with β = 0, and pet π be its stationary distribution. We lower bound the Sobolev constant ρ(M ) in terms of ρ(M ), obtaining
Step 2: Define M † by restricting transitions within M to movement to and from "holding actions." We lower bound ρ(M ) in terms of ρ(M † ), obtaining the bound
Step 3: We consider a random walk over a convex set C which is equivalent to M † . For the random walk, we lower bound E(f, f ) and upper bound L(f, f ) for any function f : C → R. This yields a lower bound on its Sobolev constant per (8) , and hence on ρ(M † ).
Step 4: We combine the string of inequalities to obtain a bound on the Sobolev constant ρ(M ),
where A is a constant, and c 1 is a constant depending on s.
We now prove each step in detail.
Step 1, M to M : In M an updating agent chooses his next action uniformly at random (u.a.r.). Per Equation (17) with β = 0, the stationary distribution π of M is the uniform distribution. Let x, y ∈ X. We bound π x /π x and M (x, y)/M (x, y) to use Corollary 3.15 in [18] :
Similarly, for y = ( 1] for all x ∈ X, for any x, y ∈ X of the above form,
For a transition to any y not of the form above, M (x, y) = M (x, y) = 0. Using this fact and Equations (20) and (21), we apply Corollary 3.15 in [18] :
Step 2, M to M † : Consider the Markov chain M † on X, where transitions from state x to y occur as follows:
• Choose a population N i with probability s i /σ • Choose j ∈ {1, . . . , s i − 1} and choose κ ∈ {−1, 1}, each u.a.r. x) for any x, y ∈ X, M † is reversible with the uniform distribution over X. Hence the stationary distribution is uniform, and π † = π .
For a transition x to y in which an agent from population N i changes his action,
since s ≥ s i , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Using (23) and the fact that π = π † , we apply Corollary 3.15 from [18] :
Step 3, M † to a random walk: The following random walk on
is equivalent to M † . For x ∈ C, transition to y as follows:
• Choose i ∈ [σ − m] and κ ∈ {−1, 1}, each u.a.r.
The stationary distribution of this random walk is uniform. We lower bound the Sobolev constant, ρ(M † ), which, using the above steps, lower bounds ρ(M ) and hence upper bounds the mixing time of our algorithm.
Let g : C → R be an arbitrary function. To lower bound ρ(M † ), we will lower bound E(g, g) and upper bound L(g). The ratio of these bounds lower bounds the ratio E(g, g)/L(g) and hence the Sobolev constant. We will use a theorem due to [7] which applies to an extension of a function g : C → R to a function defined over the convex hull of C; here we define this extension.
Let K be the convex hull of C. Given g : C → R, we follow the procedure of [7] , [20] to extend g to a function g ε : K → R. For x ∈ C, let C(x) and C(x, ε) be the σ − m dimensional cubes of center x and sides 1 and 1 − 2ε respectively. For sufficiently small ε > 0 and z ∈ C(x), define g ε : K → R by: 
Applying Theorem 2 of [7] for K ∈ R σ−m with diameter
Using similar techniques to [20] , we can obtain the bounds E(g, g) ≥ ε→0 εI ε |C|(σ − m)
and
Step 4, Combining inequalities: Using inequalities (27), (28), and (29), where c 1 = c 1 (s) is a constant depending only on s, µ(t) − π T V ≤ ε. The proof of Lemma 3 follows the derivation method for Equations (23) and (25) in [20] and is omitted for brevity.
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 follows from the above lemmas in a similar manner as the proof of Theorem 3 in [20] . Details are omitted for brevity.
